We introduce the notion of privacy-preserving verifiability for security protocols. It holds when a protocol admits a verifiability test that does not reveal, to the verifier that runs it, more pieces of information about the protocol's execution than those required to run the test. Our definition of privacy-preserving verifiability is general and applies to cryptographic protocols as well as to human security protocols. In this paper we exemplify it in the domain of e-exams. We prove that the notion is meaningful by studying an existing exam protocol that is verifiable but whose verifiability tests are not privacy-preserving. We prove that the notion is applicable: we review the protocol using functional encryption so that it admits a verifiability test that preserves privacy according to our definition. We analyse, in ProVerif, that the verifiability holds despite malicious parties and that the new protocol maintains all the security properties of the original protocol, so proving that our privacy-preserving verifiability can be achieved starting from existing security.
INTRODUCTION
"Being verifiable" is an appreciated quality for a protocol. It says that during its execution the protocol safely stores pieces of information that can be used later as evidence to determine that certain properties have been preserved by the protocol's run. A voting system that offers its voters to "verify that their votes have been cast as intended", for instance, generates data that allow a voter to test that his/her ballot has been registered and that it contains, with no mistake, the expression of his/her vote (Adida and Neff, 2006) . This paper is about verifiability, but it also discusses a new requirement for it. The requirement states that a curious verifier, in addition to the verifiability test's result, should learn no more about the system's execution than the pieces of information that he needs to know to run the test.
The need-to-know principle is not new (e.g., see (Department of Defence, 1987) ). Not new is also the particular interpretation of the principle that link to techniques like zero knowledge proofs (De Santis et al., 1988) where a verifier is convinced of a given statement's truth without learning no more than that. However, in this paper we originally present and discuss the principle as a requirement for verifiability.
Our notion of privacy-preserving verifiability needs to be formally defined, and we do so in §3. We contextualize the definition to the particular domain of electronic exams, where verifiability and privacy are sensitive properties (the first should work despite untrusted authorities, the second is not everlasting but conditional). Besides, in §4, we prove that our notion of privacy-preserving verifiability is meaningful. We show for a particular protocol called Remark! that several of its current universal verifiability are not privacy-preserving according to our definition. In §5, we give evidence that achieving privacypreserving verifiability is possible. In particular, again taking Remark! as use case, we demonstrate that by modifying the protocol's design it becomes possible to have, for one of the protocol's verifiability property, a test that is privacy-preserving. The modification we operate on the protocol is guided straightforwardly by the predicate that the verifiability test is expected to check. The other verifiability properties of Remark! rely on predicates which are, in their structure, similar to that we prove our case (i.e., they are all predicate about integrity and authentication); thus, we can easily, we claim, achieve privacypreserving verifiability for them too.
In §6, we analyse formally the new protocol. We verify with Proverif (Blanchet, 2014 ) that the new de-sign does not compromise any of the protocol's enjoyed security including all its other verifiability properties. This analysis is a significant step since we prove that privacy-preserving verifiability for a specific verifiability test can be achieved while preserving all the existing security properties of the protocol.
Before moving to the technical part of the paper it is important to anticipate that private-preserving verifiability can be potentially achieved using many of the instruments that computer security research offers today for minimize the disclosure of information. Noninteractive Zero-knowledge proofs (De Santis et al., 1988) and functional encryption schemes (Boneh et al., 2011) are the two instruments that stand out for this purpose. Here, we use the second instrument. We do not have a formal proof but we discuss in §7 that only Functional Encryption has features that make it suitable to our purpose.
RELATED WORK
Privacy and verifiability, apparently two contrasting properties, have been discussed in the literature mainly to show that they can be both satisfied in the same system.
Most of the works discussing privacy and verifiability in this sense are about voting systems. The literature on the subject is vast but, to make our point, we comment the work of Cuvelier et al. (Cuvelier et al., 2013) . The authors propose a new primitive, called Commitment Consistent Encryption. With it, they redesign a voting scheme for an election that is verifiable while ensuring everlasting ballot privacy. The problem they solve for voting is clearly related to that we raise here: avoid that from a public audit trail a verifier could learn more than it is allowed to learn. To a certain extent, Cuvelier et al. propose a cryptographic instance of the problem that we formalize in this paper. But our notion of privacy-preserving verifiability is more general and not necessarily cryptographic: it applies to cryptographic protocols as well as to non-crypto protocols. It is, in other words, a functional requirement for the verifiability tests that a system offers to auditors. In this sense, our work relates more to the plentiful research that discusses requirements and definitions of privacy. Again, the literature on this subject is huge, but the work that most closely represents the notion of privacy-preservation that we advance here is that of Mödersheim et al. (Mödersheim et al., 2013) . The work presents and discusses α−β privacy where α is what an adversary knows, and β are the cryptographic messages that the adversary sees. Then α − β privacy means that the intruder can derive from β only what he can derive from α already. We have not tried it, but we think that our notion of privacy-preservation can be formulated in term of α − β privacy. It that were true, since Mödersheim et al. prove that their definition subsumes static equivalence of frames and is in some part decidable with existing formal method tools, we would gain further ways to prove our notion formally.
This paper also relates with the research on verifiability. This is a property that has been studied prevalently, but not exclusively, in secure voting, where different models and requirements have been proposed (Küsters et al., 2010; Kremer et al., 2010) . For instance, individual verifiability is introduced as the ability that voters have to prove that their votes have been "cast as intended", "recorded as cast", and "counted as recorded" (Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994; Hirt and Sako, 2000) , while universal verifiability as the ability to verify the correctness of the tally using only public information (Cohen and Fischer, 1985; Benaloh and Tuinstra, 1994; Benaloh, 1996) . Tools have been proposed to analyse the security of verifiability: Kremer et al. formalise individual and universal verifiability in the applied picalculus, and Smyth et al. use ProVerif to check verifiability in three voting protocols.
We also base our definition of verifiability on previous work. The formalization we propose is based on the model proposed in (Dreier et al., 2015) This choice is not a coincidence. That work is about verifiable e-exams, the same domain that we take here as a use case to demonstrate that our notion of privacypreserving verifiability is meaningful and effective. Besides, that work proves that Remark!, an exam protocol rich in security properties , is verifiable. Such a proof is fundamental for this paper, since we need to consider a protocol that is verifiable although we need it be not privacypreserving. Thus, as use case, we also chose Remark!. These four relations model the state of the exam's execution at the end of each of the four phases. They are, in fact, execution logs. There are no requirements between the relations, and this is because the model is meant to capture also executions which are erroneous or corrupted. It may happen that a test assigned to no one is submitted fraudulently (i.e., creation of test) or that a test assigned to a candidate is duplicated and answered in two possible ways, and both copies are submitted (i.e., duplication of a test). It may happen as well as that a submitted test is never marked because it got lost (i.e., loss of a legitimately submitted and answered test).
MODELS & DEFINITIONS
Authentication and integrity properties are expressed as predicates over E. Let c, q, a and m range over ID, Q, A and M respectively. An example of property is Marking Integrity, which states that no mark has changed from marking to notification, and it is written as follows:
Another property, Testing Integrity expresses that all the exams that have been marked are submitted for marking. It is as follows:
Properties can be easily combined. For example, Marking and Test Integrity is obtained by conjunction from the previous properties: 
where E |= p means that p holds on E.
A Refined Exam's Abstract Model. Dreier et al.' s model partially serves the goal of this paper: it is too abstract to capture non-trivial notions of privacy like the one we intend to advance (see Definition 4). We need a formalism able to model encrypted logs, tests which run over them, and knowledge gained from running a test and about the exam's run. It is in the interplay between these elements where our notion of privacy-preserving verifiability will emerge.
Precisely, besides the abstract model, E, which represents an exam's log always in clear-text, we consider a concrete model, {E}, which models the actual and possibly encrypted logs of an exam's execution. A verifiability test is executed on the concrete model {E}. 
Any proof aiming at convincing that p is verifiable needs to clarify how the test that operates on {E} is sound and complete with respect to the validity of p on E.
The notion of privacy-preserving verifiability is defined in respect to what a verifier, say v, can learn about E by running test p ({E}, K). We are, however, not interested to capture what v can learn incrementally by running several and cleverly selected tests. Potentially, quite a deal can be deduced by inference attacks, see (Naveed et al., 2015) , but studying the leaks due to such attacks is a goal outside the scope of this paper.
Let If we assume v be a passive but curious adversary, and if we assume that the learning process works at the symbolic level of messages, the deduction relation ⊢ over messages defines the ability to learn. It is the minimal relation that satisfies the following equations:
In the relation above, we abstract from symmetric/asymmetric encryption: k −1 is the key to decrypt, whatever the paradigm of reference.
Definition 4. Let E be any execution of an exam protocol and test p a test for verifiability for a property p. The test is privacy-preserving if by running it v does not learn more about the exam execution than he knows from the information he is given to run the test. Formally:
Definition 4 says that v should learn about E no more than what he knows already from the portion of the exam's log and from additional knowledge, i.e., from the pieces of information that he needs to know to run the test. In Definition 4 we have slightly overloaded the operator ∩. Since E is a tuple of sets it must be considered applied over each element of the tuple that is:
. Similarly the interpretation of ⊆ when applied to tuple of sets, must be extended to tuple, that is:
Definition 5 (Privacy-Preserving Verifiability). A protocol is privacy-preserving verifiable with respect to a property p, if p is verifiable and admits a verifiability test test p that is privacy-preserving.

MEANINGFULNESS Claim 1. Our notion of privacy-preserving verifiability is meaningful: it can be used to distinguish verifiable protocols that are privacy-preserving from those which are not.
To prove the claim, we refer to an e-exam protocol whose verifiability (with respect to several properties) has been established formally. The protocol is called Remark! . The protocol is structured in the four typical phases of an exam. Its message flow is recalled in Figure 1 , where C is a candidate and E is an examiner. Only one candidate and one examiner are shown for conciseness, but the protocol is supposed to work for all candidates and all examiners and it is executed by them all. An exam authority, A, helps the process.
Description. The Preparation is the phase where pseudonyms are generated to ensure a double blind anonymity in testing and marking. Here, n exponential mixnets, M in Figure, generate the pseudonyms Pk C for the registered candidate C. The candidate already possesses a pair of public/private keys, Pk C , Sk C and uses the private key to recognize its designated pseudonym among the pseudonyms generated for all the candidates and posted on a public bulletin board (BB, in Figure) . Similarly, the mixnets generate pseudonyms for the examiner. A zero-knowledge proof of the generation is present on the bulletin board as proof of correctness of the generation process.
At Examination, the selected questions are signed by the authority and encrypted with the pseudonym of the candidates. The questions are posted on the bulletin board from where the candidates retrieve them. Then they answer the questions. In Figure, ques is the question and ans is an answer. The candidate C prepares a tuple ques, ans, Pk C , which he signs with its private key Sk C . The tuple is then encrypts with the public key of the authority and send to it. The authority decrypts and re-encrypts the message with the candidate pseudonym and publishes the message on the bulletin board.
At Marking the authority dispatches the tests to the examiners. In Figure, A signs the answered test and uses the pseudonyms of the examiner, i.e., Pk E , as encryption keys. Hevene re-encrypts with it the answered test and publishes it on the bulletin board. From there, similarly to what the candidates did with the questions, E retrieves the test, marks them (i.e., assigns a mark M), and prepares a tuple with the answered tests signed by the authority and the marking, which E signs further with its secret key Sk E . Encrypted this with the public key of the authority, E returns this message to the A who, in turn, decrypts the marking and re-encrypts it with the pseudonym of the candidate Pk C .
At Notification the candidates' anonymity is revoked and the marks can finally be registered. The phase starts when the authority publishes all the marks together. On request the mixnets reveal (on an authenticated encrypted channel like one using TLS) the random values used to generate the pseudonyms (in Figure, r m , for C) . Security Properties. Remark! ensures several authentication, anonymity, privacy and verifiability properties. Here, we focus on verifiability, in particular on universal verifiability. Universal means that anyone only by using public knowledge and without having participated in the protocol execution can verify that a specific property holds over the execution. The public data is generally that available on the bulletin board; the pieces of additional information are explicitly provided for the test, e.g., by the authority.
Remark! has been proven to be verifiable for five properties (Dreier et al., 2014 The properties are verifiable only if the exam authority handles to the verifier some data after the exam has ended. For instance to verify Registration Correctness the manager must reveal the signatures inside the receipts {Sign Sk A (H(T C )} Pk C posted on the bulletin board and the random values used to encrypt the receipts. To verify Marking Correctness, the manager must reveal the marked exam-tests inside the evaluations {Sign Sk E ,h E (M C )} Pk A , the random values used to encrypt the marked tests, and the table correct ans (not described in Figure 1 ) that defines what is the mark given a question and an answer; to verify Test Integrity and Test Markedness, the manager must reveal the marked exam-tests inside the evaluations, the random values used to encrypt the marked tests, plus the data disclosed for Registration; finally, to verify Mark Integrity, the manager must reveal the examiners' signatures on the marked examtests inside the evaluations, and the random values used to encrypt the notifications {Sign Sk E ,h E (M C )} Pk C before posting them on the bulletin board.
Discussion. Let us see where Remark!'s verifiability fails to be privacy-preserving.
To verify Registration Correctness, Remark! prescribes a test that takes the pseudonyms of the candidates signed by the mixnet, i.e., message Sign SK M (Pk C , h C ), and the receipts of submissions generated by the exam authority i.e., messages {Sign SK A (H(T C )} Pk C . The test succeeds if for each pseudonym there is a unique receipt of submission. The verifier does not know any other information about the execution of the exam apart the pseudonyms and the hash version of the tests. Hence, the registration test satisfies Definition 4.
To verify Marking Correctness, the protocol requires a test that inputs Sign SK M (Pk C , h C ), the table correct ans, and the mark notifications signed by the examiner and published by the exam authority
The test needs also the help of the exam authority that decrypt these last messages, and reveals the M C = Sign SK A (Pk E , T C ), mark which reveals the pseudonym of the examiner who marked the answers, the questions, and the mark. This test does not satisfy Definition 4: the verifier learns the questions, the answers, and the link between candidate and examiner pseudonyms.
To verify Test Integrity, the protocol needs a test that takes message Sign SK M (Pk C , h C ), the receipts of submissions {Sign SK A (H(T C )} Pk C , and the mark notifications generated by the exam authority {Sign SK E ,h E (M C )} Pk C . This test reveals to the verifier questions, answers, and the link between candidate and examiner pseudonyms, which are leaked in the mark notifications, so it does not satisfy Definition 4
To verify Test Markedness a test needs to input the same data as in test integrity. The same considerations outlined above applies for this test and the test does not satisfy Definition 4.
To verify Mark Integrity, Remark! prescribes a test that takes in the mark notifications {Sign SK E ,h E (M C )} Pk C and allows the verifier to check if the marks that the exam authority assigned to the candidates (in Figure, Register Pk C , mark) coincide with the marks that the examiner assigned to the candidates tests in M C = Sign SK A (Pk E , T C ), mark . Once more, the knowledge of questions, answers, and link between candidate and examiner pseudonyms is leaked by M C , although those pieces of information are not necessary to evaluate mark integrity. Also this test does not respect Definition 4.
Overall, Remark! is privacy-preserving only for Registration Correctness verifiability.
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APPLICABILITY
Except for Registration Correctness, all the tests for universal verifiability that Remark! offers are not privacy preserving. Here, we show how to make them privacy-preserving. For reason of space we show the technique only that the test about Mark and Test Integrity verifiability. We claim, but we leave a proof for future work, that we can apply the same idea of solution to achieve privacy-preserving verifiability for all the other verifiability tests.
To achieve our goal we propose a version of Remark! that relies on Functional Encryption (FE). This is an encrypting paradigm that relies on the notion of FE scheme (Boneh et al., 2011 A FE scheme should be of course instantiated cryptographically, but whatever implementation we chose it must satisfy two specific requirements: correctness and secure indistinguishability.
The requirement of correctness says that the functions in Definition 6 behave as described: for all (Pk, Msk) ← Setup(1 λ , 1 n ), and all C ∈ C n and m ∈ {0, 1} n , and for Tok The requirement of secure indistinguishability says that the scheme is "cryptographically secure" against any active and strong enough adversary (i.e., uniform probabilistic polynomial time adversaries). Such an adversary, despite having seen tokens Tok Msk C , cannot distinguish (with a nonnegligible advantage over pure guessing) two ciphertexts Enc(Pk, m 0 ) and Enc(Pk, m 1 ) for which C(m 0 ) = C(m 1 ).
A stronger security requirement used in FE is simulation-security, but due to impossibility results for it (see (Boneh et al., 2011) ), we limit our assumption to indistinguishability security.
Revising the Protocol
We modify Remark! and let it have a test for Universal Marking and Test Integrity (UMTI) verifiability that is privacy-preserving according to our Definition 4. We use a FE scheme to encrypt the messages that the verifier needs to process when running the test. From §3 we recall that the test should decide the following predicate:
The test should succeed if and only if the set of all notified marks to candidates is included in the set of exams that have been marked for those candidates and the exams marked should be those that the have submitted for marking.
As we discussed in §4, in Remark! this test allows the verifier see all messages Sign SK E ,h E (M C ) which he needs to build the sets as in Equation (4). Thus, the verifier gets to know the questions and answers and their link with the candidate identifiers.
By resorting to a FE scheme we intend to achieve a version of the test that implements predicate (4) that does not reveal a candidate's questions and answers, which is a sufficient condition to satisfy Definition 5. Figure 2 shows the new protocol, but reports only the messages that have been modified. We assume a trusted FE authority that generates the public Pk FE from Msk. It can be any party, internal or external, but must be trusted in this particular task. It is implicit in the Figure 2 , visible only when we use Pk FE . Messages in step 5 and in step 8 are those which change. In 5 the exam authority encrypts with Pk FE the signature of a test T C that a candidate submitted for marking. It also post a digest of the same message, signed with the candidate's pseudonym. To avoid that the message encrypted under Pk FE and that encrypted under Pk C hide two different values (i.e., y and T C such that H(T C ) = y), we require a non-interactive zero knowledge proof (NIZK) of consistency, π in Figure. Similarly, in step 8 the authority encrypts with Pk FE the marking and another NIZK π ′ is required.
Revising the Verifiability Test
Ciphertexts in 5 and in 8 will be used in combination with the tokens that the FE authority prepares for the verifier. It needs tokens that implement two functions:
The first, function f 1 , embeds the public-keys Pk C and Pk E and the mark mark to be verified. It is supposed to input Sign Sk E ,h E (M C ), the message in 8. After properly parsing the strings, checks whether the mark, say mark ′ , contained in M C is equal to mark, checks the signature and checks whether the Pk ′ C contained in T C (in turn, contained in M C ) equals Pk C . It also verifies the validity of the zero-knowledge proof π. If a check fails, the function returns 0. If all checks succeed, it returns 1. Function f 1 is coded as follows:
The second function, f 2 , embeds the public-key Pk C and the message Sign Sk E ,h E (M C ). It expects to input the second part of message 5, Sign Sk C ,h C (T C ). It checks the signatures and whether both messages refer to the same exam test. The function returns 0 as soon as one check fails, 1 otherwise. Function f 2 is coded as follows:
The verifiability test uses two sets of tokens of form Tok The test then calls the function Eval over those tokens to check whether the f 1 and f 2 holds on the messages found on the bulletin board that correspond the the messages that the verifier needs to implement the test in Equation (4).
test UMTI ({E}, K) first verifies whether for each notified mark per candidate there exists at least one message among those in step 8 that corresponds to the mark for a test of that candidate; if one is found the test continues and checks whether there is at least one message among those in step 5 that corresponds to that exam for that candidate submitted for marking.
The test requires to know the markings that have been notified to the candidates and PK E the public key of the authority, so K = {(Pk C , mark C ) : C ∈ ID rc } ∪ {Pk E }. Formally the test is implemented by the following algorithm:
GETTOK is used to retrieve a specific token. Here, we use the function's embedded parameters to indicate which token is being requested. However, the verifier does not necessarily know the value of the parameter to perform such request, but he must be able to indicate the token he needs e.g., by means of an index. Relations R and R ′ are so defined:
Discussion. We argue that test UMTI ({E}, K) is privacy preserving. By assumption, the FE scheme satisfies the indistinguishability security. Thus, a Dolev-Yao attacker, given a ciphertext Ct encrypting a message m and a token for a function f , can only derive f (m). This holds also for a curious verifier who observes the tokens for the two functions f 1 and f 2 . The crucial consideration is that, by construction, such two functions return a Boolean value and nothing about the messages that are considered in our model (cf. Definition 1) of an exam's execution. Moreover, among the messages that the verifier gets in input, precisely in K, there is nothing that allows him to decrypt other messages on the bulletin board. Actually, all the decryption operations that the verifier needs are realized within the function Eval. Therefore, it follows that test UMTI ({E}, K) is privacy preserving according to Definition 4.
FORMAL ANALYSIS
We prove formally that the verifiability test is sound and complete and that the new protocol does satisfy the same security properties as the original Remark!. This exercise of formal analysis is necessary because we intend to get insurance than we achieve privacypreserving verifiability incrementally, on top of all the authentication, integrity and privacy properties holding on the protocol and not on their expenses. We perform the analysis in Proverif (Blanchet, 2014) . Our ProVerif model of the protocol is an extension of the original Remark! model as it was presented in (Dreier et al., 2014) . The extension mainly regards the following aspects:
• A ProVerif specification that reflects the new protocol description.
• A new equational theory for the Functional Encryption primitives defined in our protocol.
• A new UMTI verifiability test.
The equational theory is illustrated in Table 1 to model the cryptographic primitives of the protocol. getmess(sig(m, k) checksig(sig(m, ps pr(k, exp(rce) decrypt(enc(m, pk(k) , r), k) = m decrypt (enc(m, ps pub(pk(k) , rce), r), ps pr(k, exp(rce))) = m checkps (ps pub(pk(k), rce), ps pr(k, exp(rce) )) = true
FE f1
eval f1 (pk(k), ps pub(pk(k), rc), ps pub(pk(k), re), mark, enc(sig(sig(ps pub(pk(k), re) , (q, a, ps pub(pk(k) , rc)), k), mark, ps pr(k, exp(re) )), pk(k))) = true
FE f2
eval f2 (pk(k), ps pub(pk(k), rc), enc(sig((q, a, ps pub(pk(k) , rc)), ps pr (k, exp(rce) 
The equations that model the digital signature are rather standard in ProVerif. ElGamal encryption is extended with equations that model pseudonyms as public keys: the pseudonym, which also serves as test identifier, can be generated using the function ps pub which takes in a public key and a random exponent. In fact, this function models the main feature of exponentiation mixnet. Function ps pr can be used by a principal to decrypt or sign anonymous messages. The function takes in the private key of the principal and the new generator published by the mixnet. Function checkps allows a principal to check whether a pseudonym is associated with the principal's private key. In practice, principals use this function to identify their pseudonyms published on the bulletin board. A public channel models the bulletin board.
The the equations that defines eval f1 and eval f2 model the two Functional Encryption primitives f 1 and f 2 respectively. They return true if and only if the corresponding plaintext version f 1 and f 2 return true. Note that our equational theory of functional encryption captures the property of verifiable FE. Whenever an encrypted message has a form that is not consistent with the constructor enc, the deterministic eval fails, and no rule can be applied. We do not explicitly model the generation of the token: Setup and KeyGen are generated by a trustworthy authority. It follows that the only two allowable functions are f 1 and f 2 .
Verifiability. From Definition 3, we recall that a protocol is p-verifiable if it admits a sound and complete algorithm that decides p. Soundness means that the verifiability-test returns true only if the property holds. Completeness means that if the property holds, the verifiability-test always returns true.
We use ProVerif's correspondence assertions to prove soundness. The verification strategy consists of checking that the event OK emitted by the verifiabilitytest when it is supposed to return true is always preceded by the event emitted in the part of the code where the property becomes satisfied. In case of Mark and Test Integrity, this happens when the exam authority assigns the mark to the candidate.
We resort to the unreachability of the event KO, which is emitted by the verifiability-test when it is supposed to return false, to prove completeness. In this case, the ProVerif model enforces only honest principals and prevents the attacker to manipulate the input data of the verifiability-test. In fact, a complete verifiability-test must succeed if its input data is correct. ProVerif confirms that our protocol meets UMTI verifiability and the verifiability-test is sound and complete 1 .
We observe that ProVerif can only prove the case in which only one entry on the bulletin board is considered. Mark Integrity verifiability requires that all and only the marks associated to the tests are assigned to the corresponding candidates. Thus, we need to iterate over all candidates who submitted their tests, but ProVerif cannot do this automatically as it does not support loops. We resort on the manual induction proofs provided by Dreier et al. (Dreier et al., 2014) in which the base case is given by the automated result in ProVerif, and then generalise such result to the general case with an arbitrary number of candidates, tests, and marks. Those proofs applies to the original Remark! as well as to this new version. In fact, the assumption that the auditor can check the correspondences of the assigned entries to the marked entries on the bulletin board does not change: each entry that appears on the bulletin board at step 6 of the protocol can be matched to an entry that appears on the bulletin board at step 8 of the protocol.
Authentication.
The new protocol meets all the original authentication properties of Remark!. Since the new protocol differs from Remark! only in messages 5 and 8, we could reuse the same authentication definitions advanced by Dreier et al. (Dreier et al., 2014) and verify them in Proverif.
CONCLUSION
In this pioneering work, we put forth a new notion of security that entails features of both verifiability and privacy. To illustrate the benefits of our framework, we proved that our definition is meaningful enough to empower applications in the concrete domain of electronic exams and in particular to an extension of an exam protocol that satisfies several verifiability properties but which is not compliantly with our privacypreserving requirement.
To achieve our goals, we employ the cryptographic tool of Functional Encryption (FE). Only with FE we can verify obliviously a property that is global over the execution of the protocol, a property that is about the data handled and processed by several agents in the protocol's run. In making this choice we considered to obtained the same effect with other tools, the most promising be zero knowledge proofs, but, we claim, using this tool would have required an authority that looks at the execution and adds the proofs and that interacts with the several protocol agent's asking them for other Zero-Knowledge proofs, so changing too much how an exam should work. This argument requires however a proof and we plan to inquire into this question as future work.
We have not benchmarked the new protocol. At current stage, our result is only of theoretical relevance due to the high computational cost of FE for circuits that we assumed and for this reason we recognize that FE may look as be an overkilling to someone. However, there is another feature of electronic exams that must be considered here. The limited dimension of the an exam's audiences and the expected time of an exam's notification makes feasible implementations that rely on time-inefficient encryption schemes. Comparing with electronic voting, for instance, where a whole country is involved and where a result is nowadays expected be announced within the day, for an exam the expected audiences is definitely far more contained while waiting weeks is a perfectly acceptable time frame to get notified of the result. We defer to further research about implementing our privacy-preserving verifiability notion efficiently.
It should be stressed that although contextualized in reference to exams, our research is not bound to work in that domain only. The notion of privacypreserving verifiability is abstract and the solution that we propose to ensure privacy-preservation is demonstrated for a universal verifiability test of a common integrity and authentiation property. Therefor it seems plausible to apply our results in other domains, like voting or auction, where the verifiability properties are also about integrity and authentication. Proving this claim is future work.
We conclude by pointing to a future work for us and an open problem to whom it may be interested: to study the relation between our notion and that presented by Mödersheim et al. of α-β privacy (Mödersheim et al., 2013) . Were this correlation proved, we could gain a straightforward way to verify formally privacy-preserving verifiability through the fact α-β privacy subsumes static equivalence.
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